PROSECUTORIAL PASSION, COGNITIVE
BIAS, AND PLEA BARGAINING
ALAFAIR
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The overwhelming majority of criminal defendants plead guilty,
rendering jury trials the exception in criminal courts and negotiated
pleas the norm.' The standard explanation for high rates of guilty pleas
is that we have not allocated the prosecutorial, defense, and judicial
resources that would be necessary to try every criminal case.2 To
accommodate the vast disparity between the capacity of our criminal
court system and the demands placed upon it, prosecutors induce
defendants to plead guilty by offering them discounts in the form of
reduced charges and both binding and non-binding sentencing
recommendations.
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges are
willing to support fair case resolutions that can be obtained without
trials, and the plea bargaining system treats as "fair" outcomes that
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1. According to the Department of Justice, ninety-five percent of state court felony
convictions in 2002 resulted from guilty pleas, while only two percent resulted from jury trials.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.46.2002 (2004), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/

t5462002.pdf. Similarly, in federal courts in 2003, more than ninety-six percent of convictions
resulted from pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.17.2003

(2005), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5172003.pdf.
2. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S

TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA

BARGAINING IN AMERICA 163-64 (2003) (attributing the rise of plea bargaining to caseload
pressures); Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 50 (1968) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role] ("The guilty-plea system has
grown largely as a product of circumstance, not choice."); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/BargainingTradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 37 (2002) (noting that the literature on
plea bargaining "assumes that fewer plea bargains will lead to corresponding increases in
criminal trials"); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) ("If every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.").
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favor defendants who waive their trial rights over those who do not.
Advocates of plea bargaining depict the system as advantageous to
defendants who reap discounts in exchange for their guilty pleas.4
Critics of plea bargaining depict the practice more ominously as a
system that extracts a trial penalty from defendants who choose to
exercise the trial rights to which they are entitled and coerces
unconvictable and even innocent defendants to plead guilty.'
Regardless of whether post-plea sentences are seen as discounts, or
post-trial sentences as inflations, a separate consideration is what drives
the discrepancy between the two. The standard account in support of
plea bargaining is that it reflects both the likely trial and sentencing
outcomes. It reflects trial outcomes because a prosecutor's incentive to
compromise and a defendant's power to demand consideration in
exchange for his plea will depend on the strength of the government's
evidence against the defendant.6 It reflects sentencing outcomes

3. The average federal sentence in 2003 resulting from guilty pleas was 54.7 months
compared with the average post-trial sentence of 153.7 months. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 75 tbl.5.3 (2005).

Estimates of the discount a pleading defendant enjoys vary widely, but the discount is
substantial by any account.
4. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEx. L. REV. 717, 763
(2005) (maintaining that plea bargaining benefits a defendant as long as the government has a
credible basis for going to trial); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargainingas Compromise, 101
YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1913-17 (1992). The public, of course, does not tend to see the
rewarding of criminals favorably, even in exchange for their guilty pleas. See id. at 1909 n.4
(noting that a majority of the public disapproves of plea bargaining as being overly lenient to
criminals).
5. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652,
670-80, 713-16 (1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate]; Albert
W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1278-79
(1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role]; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role, supra note 2, at 60; Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:The
Control of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 46-47, 55; Kenneth Kipnis,
CriminalJustice and the Negotiated Plea,86 ETHICS 93, 99 (1976); John H. Langbein, Torture
and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12-19 (1978); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 70 (1988); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 779 (1980); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1982-83 (1992) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster];cf Oren Gazal-Ayal, PartialBan on Plea Bargains,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2302-03 (2006) (advocating the rejection of pleas with substantial
concessions as a means of banning plea bargaining when the government has a weak case).
6. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole, supra note 2, at 58-60; Easterbrook, supra
note 4, at 1972; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1942. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea
BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2464 n.1, 2465 n.2 (2004)
(citing to the many scholarly works that adopt a shadow-of-trial model to explain negotiated
settlements in both the civil and criminal contexts).
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because whatever discount the defendant is in a position to negotiate is
subtracted from his likely post-trial sentence, considering the severity of
the offense and the defendant's criminal history and need for
punishment.
Although probable trial and post-trial sentencing outcomes are
reflected in plea bargaining, they are not determinative. A growing
literature explores the ways that other, less justifiable influences can
distort plea bargaining. Structural factors such as limited pretrial
discovery, attorney self-interest and incompetence, pretrial detention,
and determinate sentencing can affect the parties' willingness and power
to negotiate.8 Several scholars have also observed the ways that
psychological and cognitive factors can influence plea bargaining.
Professor Alschuler, for example, has called for an end to plea
bargaining, in part because its outcomes often turn on an individual
defendant's optimism about his prospects or denial about his
predicament. 9 Professors Scott and Stuntz have explored the ways that
information barriers, coupled with risk aversion in innocent defendants,
can cause innocent defendants to plead guilty." Perhaps no scholar has
done more to call attention to the psychological factors that can drive
plea bargaining than Stephanos Bibas."
Professor Bibas has
compellingly demonstrated how cognitive biases such as overconfidence,
framing, denial, anchoring, and risk preferences can skew plea
bargaining. 2 The existing literature recognizes, then, that cognitive
phenomena can influence the decisions of the negotiating parties and
are therefore relevant to plea bargaining.
However, previous
examinations of the influence of cognitive bias on plea bargaining have
focused primarily on the decision making of defendants.' 3 This Article
7. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 2495 n.129 (noting that plea bargaining occurs in "the
shadow cast by the expected verdict on guilt and the shadow cast by the expected sentence").
8. See generally id. at 2468.
9. E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) ("Plea
bargaining makes a substantial part of an offender's sentence depend, not upon what he did
or his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective
of criminal proceedings."); Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate, supra note 5, at
666 (noting factors that determine sentencing in plea bargaining).
10. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1942-43 (identifying strategic impediments to
efficient bargaining and recommending reforms to improve plea bargaining).
11. Bibas, supra note 6.
12. Id. Professor Bibas's important article also discusses the ways that structural factors
such as attorney self-interest, agency costs, determinate sentencing, and pretrial detention can
lead to inefficient or unfair bargains. Id.
13. See Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 5, at 666
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seeks to contribute an additional dimension to the understanding of plea
bargaining dynamics by exploring influences on the decision making of
prosecutors.
A central tenet of plea bargaining is that prosecutors are willing to
negotiate settlements to free up trial resources for other cases.
Accordingly, the first step in this Article's exploration of prosecutorial
decision making in plea bargaining is an examination of the factors that
drive a prosecutor's prioritization of cases. Specifically, Part I argues
that prosecutors prioritize cases in part by the amount of passion they
feel in each case. Prosecutorial passion-how much a prosecutor cares
about a case-is an undefined and unexplored factor in the current
literature, and reflects subjective determinations beyond the strength of
a case's evidence or its likely post-conviction sentence.
Part II explores the ways that prosecutorial passion might affect plea
bargaining. First, passion might create a conscious aversion to plea
bargaining in prosecutors. Second, even when a passionate prosecutor
believes she desires settlement, passion might trigger or exaggerate
cognitive biases that will make settlement less likely. Part III concludes
with some brief thoughts regarding the implications of prosecutorial
passion for plea bargaining reform.
I. DEFINING PROSECUTORIAL PASSION

The most common portrait of the plea bargaining prosecutor is, to
put it mildly, unflattering. Much of the plea bargaining literature
depicts prosecutors as motivated entirely by their own interests, crassly
and singularly defined by the maintenance of high rates of conviction."4
From this view, the power that such prosecutors enjoy permits them to
manipulate the plea negotiation process to maximize their self-serving

(describing the psychology of the defendant who demands a trial); Scott & Stuntz, supra note
4, at 1948 (noting that innocent defendants are probably more averse to risk than guilty
defendants). Although Professor Bibas explores the ways that prosecutors can be affected by
overconfidence, self-serving biases, and framing, his discussions of denial, discounting of
future costs, risk propensity, and anchoring focus almost exclusively on the implications for a
defendant's decision making. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 2498-2519.
14. John Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 180
(1965); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing ProsecutorialDiscretion
and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 882 (1995) (describing "the
desire to 'win"' as "a central characteristic of prosecutorial culture"); Daniel S. Medwed, The
Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV.
125, 134 (2004) (criticizing "the emphasis district attorneys' offices place on conviction
rates").
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statistics. 5 Using leverage gained through overcharging and from
determinate sentencing laws, prosecutors can extract guilty pleas in
weak cases. Meanwhile, by refusing to offer meaningful concessions in
stronger cases, prosecutors can reserve their easiest cases for trial to
establish an impressive conviction record. Were this the end of the story
of what motivates prosecutors, then a prosecutor's willingness to
negotiate in an individual case would be dictated entirely by the
likelihood of gaining a conviction against the defendant, a factor that is
already a large part of the traditional explanation of plea bargaining
outcomes.
Perhaps, however, prosecutors' values are more complex. Obtaining
desirable conviction rates through the manipulation of plea bargaining is
not a task that drives most prosecutors into their profession.
Prosecutors might accept plea bargaining as the pragmatic side of
justice, but ultimately prosecutors are drawn to their jobs because of the
identity that comes with it,' 6 the well known obligation to be a minister
of justice' 7-an obligation, prosecutors frequently and pridefully boastthat sets them apart from other lawyers. As Professor Bruce Green has
aptly described the prosecution culture, the doing of justice is carried
out in a "muscular," "unsentimental" way, in "a tradition of machismo,
of the prosecutor as aggressive trial lawyer facing down the lawbreaking
adversary.""' Prosecutors see themselves as warriors in a fight between
the good and the guilty.'9 Like any brave warrior, the prosecutor takes
pride not simply in his win rate, but in the difficulty of the battles he is

15. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2471; Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,supra note 5, at
1988.
16. See Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1063, 1080 (2006) (reporting that colleagues at the U.S. Attorney's Office "view being a

prosecutor as more of a calling than a job" and as "part of their personal identity").
17. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2 cmt. (1993); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004). The prosecutor's obligation to do justice imposes
a dual responsibility both to punish the guilty and to protect the innocent. Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.").
18. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.

607, 609 (1999).
19. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation,and the
Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 271, 304 (2006) (noting that
prosecutors, although more sensitive to individual rights than police, often adopt a "warrior

mindset").
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willing to enter.0
To the warrior prosecutor, plea bargaining may present an easy
route to an impressive win rate, but it is also a challenge to prosecutorial
pride. Prosecutors cannot, of course, always indulge their prosecutorial
pride. To maximize limited resources, they must prioritize the most
important cases throughout each level of their decision making, using
discretion to determine which cases warrant charges,2 ' which should be
plea bargained and under what terms, which should be tried, and, in
some instances, which should be dismissed altogether. In making these
decisions, prosecutors certainly consider the likelihood of conviction in
each case. However, because of the prideful warrior mentality, they are
also influenced by prosecutorial passion. They care not only about how
many cases they win, but also which cases they win and how they are
won.
One of the most memorable conversations I had as a deputy district
attorney was with a career prosecutor in my office who had refused to
budge from what he deemed his rock-bottom offer in plea negotiations
with defense counsel. We were in the same trial unit, so I was familiar
with the case and knew it would be a difficult trial for the state to win.
My colleague knew that by cutting off plea negotiations, he had
accepted the risk of an acquittal. He was seemingly unfazed by the
choice, telling me he would rather go to trial against the defendant and

20. John Kuhn Bleimaier, God, Man and the Law, 39 CATH. LAW. 277, 286 (2000)
(noting the pride of prosecutors in winning difficult trials); see also Steve Brewer, Holmes
Won't Seek Re-election, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 13, 1999, at Al (career prosecutor stating, "I
learned that to be called a prosecutor that you need to be honest, you need to be open and
you need to have enough grit to try hard cases and enough courage to dismiss them if that's
what needs to be done"); Kenneth C. Crowe II, Long Way to Go in Court Race, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 19, 1999, at B3 (assistant district attorney running for judge
saying that "[i]t's important to try when cases are difficult"); Bill Engle, 50 Weeks of Success:
Judge David Kolger, PALLADIUM-ITEM (Richmond, Ind.), Oct. 31, 2005, at 12A (quoting a
judge and former prosecutor as saying that "[slometimes you have to try a really difficult case
even if the chances of winning are small because it is the right thing to do"); Christine Mahr,
Indio Lawyer Wins County Prosecutorof Year Nod, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.), Apr.
15, 2001, at 1B (prosecutor of the year praised because he "'consistently tries more serious,
difficult cases-really tough ones'); Kenneff vs. Totaro DA Race Remains a Hot Topic,
SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), May 9, 1999, at P-11 (noting that police overwhelmingly
supported a candidate for district attorney because "he is willing to try the difficult cases").
21. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2 (4th ed. 2004); Michael
Edmund O'Neill, UnderstandingFederalProsecutorialDeclinations:An Empirical Analysis of
Predictive Factors,41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (2004) (observing in the context of case
screening that "constraints necessarily force prosecutors to choose among possible cases to
pursue"); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1542-43 (1981) (noting that funding levels affect prosecutors' charging decisions).
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lose than try to fall asleep that night knowing he had let the defendant
off with any less than the current offer. I took his comment as more
than bluster. It was an honest and revealing description of his own
decision making. His pride as a prosecutor had created a singular
passion for this case. Of the many files in his cabinet, this was the one
that mattered most. This was a case that brought out the warrior.
The factors that drive a prosecutor's passion for a file are certainly
linked to the variables that dominate the traditional plea bargaining
story. For example, prosecutors are likely to feel most passionate when
they are absolutely certain of the defendant's guilt, a certainty that will
presumably correlate with the likelihood of obtaining a conviction at
trial and therefore with the ultimate plea settlement.
Similarly,
prosecutors are most likely to be passionate in cases with aggravating
factual circumstances, a particularly sympathetic victim, or an especially
abhorrent defendant 22-considerations that will drive up the likely posttrial sentence and therefore increase the negotiated post-plea sentence.
However, despite the correlation between prosecutorial passion and
both likely trial and sentencing outcomes, prosecutorial passion can
affect plea bargaining in ways independent of those traditional
considerations.
Importantly, prosecutorial passion, unlike a case's
likelihood of conviction and likely post-trial sentence, is specific to the
individual prosecutor. Consider, for example, a misdemeanor public
indecency case involving genital exposure to a child. A new prosecutor
assigned to his office's misdemeanor unit might feel more passion for
that case than any other case he is likely to handle in his first year of
practice. However, in the hands of a prosecutor assigned to the sex
crimes unit, the file might garner little attention. Unlike post-trial
sentences and the likelihood of conviction, the passion a prosecutor
feels for a case is determined not by an absolute consideration of the
severity of the offense, its factual circumstances, the weight of the
evidence, or the characteristics of the actors involved, but by a
consideration of those factors relative to other files in a prosecutor's
caseload.2 3

22. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, § 13.2(a) (listing the factors that affect a prosecutor's
discretion); see also Bibas, supra note 6, at 2470. See generally MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
103 (1978) (listing the degree of harm caused and violence used, the defendant's criminal
history, victim and defendant characteristics, and defendant's motive as factors that
determine a crime's severity).
23. To be sure, Bibas has previously observed that individual prosecutors might view the
same offense differently and may therefore offer different bargains in similar cases. Bibas,
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To get a sense of how prosecutors prioritize the cases assigned to
them, I recently asked several prosecutors and former prosecutors for
their thoughts about the plea bargaining process." Their narratives
illustrated the influence of experience on a prosecutor's perspective.
Cases that might have triggered passion as a junior prosecutor look
different a few years down the road. One former prosecutor described
to me how her sense of justice evolved over time:
I softened around the edges. . . . As a baby DA, I
thought all criminals needed to be punished to the fullest
extent of the law ....
As I made my way through each
unit . . . , I realized that some crimes are not worth
spending a lot of state time and resources. I recall giving
away the farm when I helped out at drug call once I had
prosecuted more serious person-felonies. '
Another prosecutor explained why an experienced prosecutor might
offer a lenient plea deal to a sympathetic defendant, even when the
evidence was a "slam dunk" and when mandatory minimum sentencing
laws would require the sentencing judge to impose a hefty sentence:
"There may be people who'd enjoy [the] accolades of trial, but as you
season, you see the bigger picture."
Prosecutorial passion not only changes with experience, but can also
be wholly subjective. One prosecutor, asked to list the factors that
drove his plea bargaining, made a point to include his "own sense of
fairness/justice" along with other, more objective factors such as the
strength of the case, the victim's desires, and the defendant's criminal
history. Another prosecutor explained how two cases involving the
identical statutory charge could result in radically different treatment
depending on the surrounding circumstances and the culpability of the
victim. As an example, he told me that a robber shooting a store clerk
supra note 6, at 2474-75. He did not, however, explore how the relative nature of a case's
evaluation might lead to further idiosyncrasies in bargaining. See id.
24. I initiated my conversation with prosecutors and former prosecutors with an email
asking, "What kinds of considerations went into your determination of whether, when, and
under what terms to give a pretrial offer? If the considerations varied from case to case,
please do your best to describe different categories of cases and the general decision making
process you used when approaching plea bargaining for each category. The question is
intentionally broad because I want to hear your reflections about your own decision making
process. In response, please say as much or as little, as formally or as informally, as you'd
like." Some lawyers responded by email, and others agreed to an oral interview.
25. See also HEUMANN, supra note 22, at 117-20 (discussing how prosecutors "mellow"
with experience in plea bargaining).
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wanting to go home to her kids is "just not the same" as a shooting in a
drug deal gone bad. Prosecutors develop their passions based on their
subjective evaluations of the facts underlying the charge, not from an
objective weighing of the statutory charge itself.2"
A few scholars have previously described the relative nature of plea
bargaining, where some cases are pled out so that other cases can be
tried. Judge Easterbrook, for example, has noted that, in exchange for
sparing a defendant the uncertainty and cost of litigation, "the
prosecutor frees up resources to pursue other criminals."27 Thirty years
ago, in his invaluable book capturing the dynamics of plea bargaining,
Milton Heumann explained how prosecutors "draw sharp distinctions
'
When cases are deemed
between serious and nonserious cases."28
nonserious, prosecutors are amenable to quick dispositions because it
"is simply not worth the effort to press."'29 When the case is serious,
however, prosecutors will seek lengthier sentences and will be less likely
to compromise, leading to more extensive and complex plea
negotiations. 3
Sometimes the trade off among cases is described as occurring at a
jurisdictional level, as if crimes for minor offenses are plea bargained so
that limited resources can be dedicated to the prosecution of more
However, only in an extremely small prosecutors'
serious crimes."
office would you find a lawyer who is responsible for such a broad array
of cases that she could, for example, negotiate away all of her petty
misdemeanors to make time for her murder cases. In a prosecutors'
26. From this perspective, prosecutorial passion reflects what has been called in the
federal sentencing guidelines context a "real offense" system, not a "charge offense" system;
it turns not on the statutory offenses listed in the charging instrument, but on the specific
circumstances of the case. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988)
(discussing the compromises made by the original United States Sentencing Commission

between a real offense and charge offense sentencing system).
27.
289, 297
28.
29.
30.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
(1983) (emphasis added).
HEUMANN, supra note 22, at 103.
Id.
Id.

31. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 296-97 (discussing the influence of a
prosecutor's office budget on charging decisions and negotiations); see Benjamin A. Naftalis,
"Queen for a Day" Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal
Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 19 (2003) (stating that plea

bargaining "helps law enforcement allocate resources toward more serious offenders"); James
P. Dowden, Note, United States v. Singleton: A Warning Shot Heard 'Round the Circuits?,40
B.C. L. REV. 897, 908-09 (1999) ("Proponents of plea bargaining also contend that it allows
both prosecutors and defendants to save their judicial resources for more serious disputes.").
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office of any significant size, a lawyer who is prosecuting murders is not
prosecuting petty misdemeanors, and vice versa. Accordingly, the
relative severity of a defendant's case is determined by comparing the
defendant not to all other defendants being prosecuted in the
jurisdiction, but to the other defendants being prosecuted by whatever
lawyer happened to be assigned the file.
II. PROSECUTORIAL PASSION AND PLEA BARGAINING

Prosecutorial passion could conceivably affect plea bargaining in two
different ways. First, passion might affect a prosecutor's cost-benefit
analysis as a rational decision maker, causing the prosecutor either to
refuse to engage in plea negotiations altogether, or to insist upon deep
concessions from the defendant to compensate the prosecutor for
relinquishing her advocacy role at trial. Second, and outside of a
rational decision-making model, prosecutorial passion might skew plea
negotiations by inducing or exaggerating cognitive biases that cause the
prosecutor to inflate both the likelihood of a conviction in the case and
the length of the likely sentence after a conviction obtained at trial. This
Part discusses each of these possibilities in turn.
A. Unwillingness to Bargain
Under a straightforward account of plea bargaining, a defendant
who pleads guilty should be sentenced to his likely post-trial sentence,
minus a "break" that reflects the resources that the government saved
by avoiding the trial. Some scholars have proposed that the break
defendants receive as compensation for their pleas should be uniform,
so that all defendants enjoy the same opportunity to claim an identical
percentage discount from their likely post-trial sentences.32 Other
scholars have argued that sentencing discounts should reflect the
likelihood that the defendant would have been acquitted at trial, so that
33
strong government cases lead to smaller discounts than weak ones.

32. Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,Part1, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, 1125 (1976) (embracing the idea of judges who would first determine the likely

"post-trial sentence" and then apply a "specific discount rate" if the defendant pleads guilty);
John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the
Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 222-23 (1977) (proposing a fixed fifty percent
sentencing discount in exchange for guilty pleas).
33. Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 297; Bibas, supra note 6, at 2537. A fixed discount
does not differentiate between defendants who are almost certain to be convicted and those
who have a strong chance of acquittal and are therefore more likely to be innocent. As
Professor Bibas has observed, "The main effect of large fixed discounts is to confer windfalls
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Regardless of how the sentencing break is calculated, plea bargaining is
premised on the assumption that defendants can claim it in exchange for
their trial rights.
However, for a defendant to be able to capture his plea bargaining
discount, his prosecutor must be willing to relinquish "the entitlement to
seek the highest sentence or pursue the most serious charges possible." '
Nearly forty years ago, Albert Alschuler described the various roles that
a prosecutor might play when considering whether and under what
circumstances to negotiate the outcome of a criminal case.35 In some
cases, she may act as an advocate motivated primarily by the
maximization of convictions and sentences.36 In her role as advocate, a
prosecutor would be reluctant to plea bargain unless the certainty of a
conviction was more valuable than the discount in the sentence awarded
to the pleading defendant.37 Alternatively, the prosecutor might act
more neutrally as the de facto sentencing judge and attempt to do the
"right thing" in sentencing, provided that the defendant plead guilty.38
In Alschuler's terms, a defendant cannot claim a sentencing discount
in exchange for his plea unless the prosecutor foregoes her ability to act
as an advocate and agrees to act instead as the de facto sentencing
judge.3" The value that a prosecutor ascribes to her role of advocate will
vary depending on the passion she feels for a case. Typically, a
defendant's plea is described as a gain to prosecutors because it saves
them the substantial cost and energy of a trial. 4" However, in a case that
triggers a prosecutor's passion, the prosecutor can attribute significant
value to her advocacy role at trial, and any negotiated plea will have to
compensate the prosecutor for surrendering it, thereby depriving the
defendant of whatever discount would typically be offered by a
passionless prosecutor who readily accepted the role of de facto
sentencing judge.4'
on defendants who have little hope of acquittal." Id.
34. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1909.
35. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 52-53.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 53.
39. Id. at 52-53.
40. Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 297; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1941.
41. See HEUMANN, supra note 22, at 103 (noting that in plea bargaining, the
prosecutor's job shifts from establishing guilt to determining the extent of the defendant's
guilt and the appropriate level of punishment); Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea
Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (2003)
(noting that in plea bargaining the prosecutor replaces the judge as the decision maker
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A prosecutor who feels passion for a case might go still further and
refuse to extend a pretrial offer altogether, preventing the defendant
from claiming any type of sentencing discount. Every prosecutor and
former prosecutor with whom I spoke said they had refused to plea
bargain in some of their cases. A former prosecutor told me, for
example, that in "one percent" of her cases, the defendants were so
deserving of punishment that they "should never get the benefit" of a
plea bargain. Another prosecutor said he would refuse to plea bargain
"if the crime was particularly egregious, the suspect had a long criminal
history, and [the prosecutor] had an air-tight case."
Of course, any prosecutor who refuses to plea bargain so she can
remain an advocate takes a chance that her advocacy will fail, the
defendant will be acquitted, and the prosecutor will never have the
opportunity to fight for any sentence at all. However, a passionate
prosecutor might actually prefer to lose the case at trial than to
acquiesce to a plea bargain that accurately reflects the likelihood of an
acquittal. If prosecutors sought only to maximize sentences, it would be
irrational for a prosecutor to prefer to lose at trial than to secure the
certainty of a conviction and at least some minimal level of punishment
in a plea bargain. However, to the passionate prosecutor, the cost of
plea bargaining is not only the possibility of obtaining a higher sentence
after trial, but also the toll on the prosecutor's pride if she surrenders
without a fight. As one prosecutor explained, "There are some cases
where the guy needs to be done because the guy's good for it." Echoing
the same words I heard my supervisor use years ago, the prosecutor
said, "I'd rather go to trial and lose." When I pressed him about how an
acquittal could ever be preferable to a conviction, he told me that to
plea bargain the cases in his file drawer about which he cared the most
would be "an injury to my own psyche, my coming here to the
courtroom everyday."42
In cases where the prosecutor refuses to relinquish her role as
advocate, the defendant cannot obtain the benefits of a plea bargain.

regarding the appropriate sentence); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1502 (1993) ("Today, judges no longer control sentences,
and thus no longer control prosecutors. Instead, prosecutors control sentences and in turn
control judges.").
42. Asked to provide an example of such a case, the prosecutor discussed a defendant
who had beaten his wife with a hammer. Even with a previous domestic violence conviction,
the defendant had dared to request probation in the parties' initial plea discussions. As a
consequence, the prosecutor never discussed settlement again. "If he'd offered to go to
prison for two years, I'd still rather have him walk out," the prosecutor explained.
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He might attempt to obtain a discount by pleading guilty to all charges,
in the hope that the sentencing judge will consider the defendant's
contrition as a mitigating factor at sentencing.43
However, the
sentencing judge cannot replicate the power of the prosecutor to show
leniency. In a case with multiple charges, only the prosecutor has the
power to dismiss some charges in exchange for the defendant's plea to
others." Once the plea is entered, determinate sentencing laws can
restrict a sympathetic judge's discretion to be lenient. 5 Furthermore,
unlike a defendant who strikes a bargain in advance with the prosecutor,
a defendant who pleads guilty and accepts open sentencing is opposed
by an adversary.46 Accordingly, the judge may be persuaded to share a
prosecutor's passion and deprive the defendant of a sentencing discount
for pleading guilty. Moreover, even if the defense convinces the judge
that some discount is warranted, the discount might be subtracted from
an exceptionally high sentence advocated by the prosecutor.
B. Skewed Plea Bargaining
Prosecutorial passion might affect plea bargaining not only by
altering the prosecutor's rational cost-benefit analysis, but also by
injecting irrationality into the prosecutor's decision making.
A
substantial body of cognitive research has compellingly demonstrated
that human decision makers are imperfect utility-maximizers and suffer
systematically from a series of cognitive biases.47 Although scholars
43. See generally David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 411 (1993) ("The defendant's

contrition or willingness to plead guilty ...traditionally ha[s] had a significant impact on the
sentence.").
44. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (providing that the government can agree not
to bring or to dismiss charges as a condition of the defendant's guilty plea).
45. Michael M. O'Hear, The OriginalIntent of Uniformity in FederalSentencing, 74 U.

CIN. L. REV. 749, 808 (2006) (noting that under the federal sentencing guidelines,
"defendants generally have little practical alternative to plea-bargaining: it is only the
prosecutor who can reliably release the defendant from the harsh rules of the guidelines").
See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, § 26.3 (discussing limits on judicial discretion at

sentencing, such as mandatory minimum sentencing laws and presumptive sentencing
guidelines).
46. As a result of binding sentencing agreements struck through plea bargaining, some
defendants enjoy absolute protection against risks at sentencing and may withdraw their
guilty plea if the sentencing judge is unwilling to follow the parties' agreed-upon disposition.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM.P. 11(c)(1)(C). Even in the usual situation of a plea bargain with a
mere sentencing recommendation, defendants assume little risk at sentencing because judges
rarely depart from the parties' joint recommendation. Alschuler, supra note 32, at 1066; see
HEUMANN, supra note 22, at 150-52.
47. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 110 (1999); STEVEN

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:183

have begun to explore the effects of these cognitive biases on plea
bargaining,' the plea bargaining literature has not yet explored the
interplay between cognitive biases and prosecutorial passion. Even
when a prosecutor relinquishes her advocacy role and attempts to
negotiate a resolution, her passion may induce or exaggerate cognitive
biases that can skew plea bargaining outcomes.
1. Selective Information Processing
Consider, for example, the ways that selective information
processing can cause a passionate prosecutor to overestimate both the
likelihood of a defendant's conviction and the probable post-conviction
sentence and therefore inflate the appropriate negotiated outcome.
Selective information processing is the tendency for people to recall
stored information and interpret new information to conform to their
pre-existing views." As a result of selective information processing,
people readily accept evidence that is consistent with their current
beliefs and find reasons to distrust or dismiss contradictory evidence."
A growing body of scholarship on prosecutorial decision making
explores the ways that the biased assimilation of evidence can prevent
prosecutors from believing defendants' claims of innocence.
In the
civil negotiation context, Professors Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen
have noted that self-serving cognitive biases can lead parties to

PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130-31 (1974), reprinted in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 18, 18-20 (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 192 (1980); see Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1997) (noting that although "[c]ognitive
errors ... may press behavior far from the anticipated directions," human decision making is
not "unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social

scientists").

48. See supra notes 11-12.
49. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
50. Id.
51. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1603-13 (2006); Keith A. Findley &
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WiS. L.
REV. 291, 312-13; Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary
on Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 1327 ("[T]he tunnel
vision problem has been widely noted in wrongful conviction cases. Officers and prosecutors
either don't realize the significance or accuracy of exculpatory evidence or on occasion

affirmatively conceal it because they are convinced of the suspect's guilt.").
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''systematically anticipate their trial prospects as being better than" their
adversaries will perceive. 2 Professor Bibas has observed that selective
information processing can have a similar effect on plea bargaining,
causing each side to conclude it deserves a better deal than the other
side believes is warranted. 3
Prosecutorial passion can only compound the distorting effects of
the prosecutor's existing beliefs about the strength and gravity of her
case. In studies that examine the effects of selective information
processing on negotiations, the degree of a negotiating party's bias is a
powerful predictor that the parties will be unable to reach an
agreement." Accordingly, the more passion a prosecutor feels for her
case, the more likely she will be to overestimate both the likelihood of
conviction and the stiffness of the ultimate sentence, thereby making her
less compliant in plea negotiations.
Furthermore, prosecutors will have more exposure to the cases
about which they are passionate than to other files in their caseload,
further cementing their existing views about the case's strength and
severity. Empirical evidence shows that, as a result of selective
information processing, exposure to information relating to our preexisting beliefs only serves to strengthen those beliefs, even when the
information is contradictory in nature. For example, in their classic
study of biased information processing, Lord, Ross, and Lepper
presented subjects with two purported studies reaching contradictory
conclusions regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty."5
Subjects who opposed the death penalty judged the study finding no
deterrent effect to be more persuasive than the contrary study, while
proponents of the death penalty preferred the study purporting to show
deterrence.5 6 As a result of biased assimilation, the new informationeven though it consisted of two contradictory studies-deepened the
subjects' commitments to their pre-existing views: advocates of the
death penalty reported stronger support for capital punishment after

52. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavorial Science: Removing the
RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1094 (2000).
53. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2498-2502.
54. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining BargainingImpasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, winter 1997, at 109, 114; George
Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange and
Inefficiency in Bargaining,33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 44 (2004).
55. Lord et al., supra note 49.
56. Id. at 2101-02.
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reading the studies, and opponents reported stronger opposition. 7
If a prosecutor is passionate about a file, she will spend more time
preparing that case for trial than the cases she intends to plead out. As
one prosecutor explained about his "special" cases, the case "lives in a
drawer" pending trial. He "thinks about them more." He has "more
contact with the victim," checking in with him about pending hearings
and verifying facts of the case in preparation for trial. He "thinks about
what else can be done investigatively." As the prosecutor reviews and
re-reviews the file while the case is pending, whatever factors first
ignited her passion will now strengthen it. If the file does contain any
exculpatory or mitigating information, the prosecutor will devalue it as a
result of her pre-existing beliefs.58
2. Loss Aversion and Framing
The phenomena of loss aversion and framing can also affect a
passionate prosecutor's plea bargaining decisions. Cognitive research
shows that people are averse to risk when given the opportunity to lock
in gains, but are risk seeking if a gamble will help them avoid a loss.59
Moreover, gain and loss are not intrinsically fixed concepts. People are
risk averse when an outcome is framed as a gain (e.g., "money
retained") and risk seeking when the same result is framed as a loss
(e.g., "money lost"). 6
Scholars have previously noted that framing can cause defendants to
perceive plea outcomes as either gains or losses, thereby promoting
either risk aversion or risk seeking. For example, Professor Richard
Birke has argued that defendants should view plea bargaining outcomes
as losses, which would typically induce risk seeking (i.e., trials).6' Birke
claims, however, that institutional pressures cause defense attorneys to
give their clients inadequate information about the expected value of a
trial and to frame plea bargaining offers as gains instead of losses.62
Similarly, Professor Bibas has explained that defendants "ordinarily"

57. Id. at 2103-04.
58. Burke, supra note 51, at 1611.
59. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
60. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984).
61. Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205,
209.
62. Id. at 209, 243.
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view plea bargains as losses, but might view them as gains if, for
example, they are in pretrial detention or know that a conviction and
severe sentence are near certainties. 63
A prosecutor who is passionate about a case is more likely to make
pretrial decisions that will cause the defendant to frame plea bargaining
as a gain. For example, a prosecutor who is passionate about a case is
more likely to request high bail or pretrial detention, which serve to
redefine the defendant's status quo as a state of incarceration and
therefore affect the defendant's framing of a plea bargain. 6
By
appearing confident about the likelihood of a trial, the chances of
prevailing at trial, and the severity of the resulting sentence, the
passionate prosecutor might also persuade the defendant that a negative
outcome is inevitable, causing him to see plea bargaining as a gain.
The passionate prosecutor, meanwhile, might view plea bargaining
as a loss. To the extent that either Birke or Bibas examines the
perspective of the prosecutor, 6' each appears to assume that prosecutors
always view plea bargains as gains and are therefore willing to bargain.66
Prosecutors might view plea bargained outcomes as gains in their typical
cases. Plea bargaining, after all, guarantees prosecutors a conviction67
and permits them to dispose of a case without the work of a trial.
However, if prosecutors are passionate about a case, they will not view it
as a typical case to be plea bargained away to make time for other (i.e.,
trial) cases. They will instead view the file as a case to be tried so they
can request a far weightier sentence than they could receive through
plea bargaining. Any disposition of the case that deprives a prosecutor
of the chance to go to trial, and results in a sentence short of the
sentence requested after trial, would be viewed as a loss. Accordingly, a
prosecutor will be more accepting of the risks of a trial and less willing
63. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2514.
64. See id. at 2491-93 (setting forth the effects of bail and pretrial detention on plea
bargaining).
65. In discussing the influence of framing on plea bargaining, both Professors Birke and
Bibas focused primarily on the defendant's decision making.
66. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 2514 ("Prosecutors stand to gain convictions by plea
bargaining."); Birke, supra note 61, at 233 ("[P]rosecutors turn time-consuming and resourceexpensive investigations and trials into time-efficient pleas, and in so doing, they can keep the
numbers of cases closed and the numbers of new cases that come in at a manageable
equilibrium.").
67. E.g., Bibas, supra note 6, at 2471-72 (stating that prosecutors who are motivated to
maintain high rates of convictions might prefer plea bargains to trials even when they result in
lower sentences); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 5, at 2321 (arguing that prosecutors use a "safety
margin" in selecting cases for prosecution because their preference for plea bargains is
"strong").
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to negotiate a plea. 8
3. Over-Optimism and Hindsight Bias
The cognitive literature suggests that passionate prosecutors might
underestimate the odds of an acquittal. As an initial matter, prosecutors
have good reason to be confident about their cases; they win the vast
majority of their trials. 9 Moreover, people in general are unrealistically
optimistic about themselves and their talents, routinely overestimating
the likelihood that good things will happen to them and underestimating
the probability of less desirable events. 0 Accordingly, a prosecutor may
persuade herself that, although her case might be a difficult one, she is
more likely than others to win it, particularly because it is a case that she
has decided to treat as a priority. A prosecutor's confidence is only
inflated by hindsight bias, the tendency for people to overestimate ex
ante the likelihood of an event once it has already occurred." Each time
a prosecutor wins a difficult trial, it reinforces her perception that a
A prosecutor who overestimates the
conviction was inevitable.
likelihood of conviction will be less malleable in plea bargaining.

68. The interplay I suggest between prosecutorial passion and framing is consistent with
recent research suggesting an emotional component to the framing effect. See Benedetto De
Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human Brain, 313
SCIENCE 684, 686-87 (2006) (finding that frame-susceptible subjects showed robust activity in
the amygdala, which processes emotions, compared to less susceptible subjects, who
demonstrated enhanced activity in the prefrontal cortex). See generally Chris Guthrie, Better
Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
43, 62 ("Litigants are human beings who possess not only the ability to crunch numbers but
also the ability to experience emotion.").
69. See HEUMANN, supra note 22, at 100 ("[Prosecutors] find that in most cases the
evidence in the file is sufficient to conclude (and prove) that the defendant is factually
guilty."). In 2003, federal prosecutors won nearly eighty-four percent of their jury trials.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, supra note 1, at tbl.5.17.2003. In
2002, convictions at trial in the country's seventy-five largest counties outnumbered acquittals
by a three to one ratio. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.57.2002 (2004),
http://www.albany.edu/source book/pdf/t5572002.pdf.
70. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 & n.22 (1998) (noting that nearly two hundred studies demonstrate
people's unrealistic optimism).
71. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. ExP. PSYCH.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288,
298 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "I Knew It Would Happen": Remembered
Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM.
PERFORMANCE 1 (1975).
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4. Anchoring
Prosecutorial passion can also affect the anchors that parties use
during plea negotiations.
Overwhelming psychological research
demonstrates that people estimate or evaluate numbers by "anchoring"
on a preliminary number and then adjusting, usually inadequately, from
the initial anchor.7 2 People inadequately adjust even when the anchor is
an arbitrary number. For example, in one study, the researchers spun a
wheel in the subjects' presence to generate a random number between
zero and one hundred. Subjects were instructed first to indicate whether
the percentage of African countries in the United Nations was higher or
lower than the random number, and then to estimate the accurate
percentage. The researchers found that the arbitrary numbers spun
from the wheel substantially influenced the subjects' responses."
Several scholars have previously explored the ways that anchoring
can distort negotiations between attorneys in civil litigation. Initial
settlement demands, however arbitrary or unrealistic, influence later
counteroffers and concessions. Professor Bibas has used anchoring to
help explain the dynamics of plea bargaining. 5 A prosecutor might
make an unreasonably high initial offer that the defendant readily
rejects; however, the initial offer serves as a high anchor that makes a
subsequent, revised offer appear reasonable in comparison. 76
Prosecutorial passion can exaggerate this anchoring effect by
triggering an even higher initial anchor. In cases that provoke a
prosecutor's
the prosecutor will charge the case more
•
177passion,
aggressively. As one former prosecutor told me, "I started out in the
72. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 47, at 14-18.
73. Id. at 14. For example, subjects who received the numbers ten and sixty-five for
their starting points gave median estimates of twenty-five and forty-five, respectively, for the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Id.
74. See JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 267-69 (1975); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way,
10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16 (1994); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
PsychologicalBarriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV.
107, 139-42 (1994).
75. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 2517-19.
76. See id.
77. Several scholars have noted that broad prosecutorial discretion in the initial charging
decision gives leverage to prosecutors in plea negotiations. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4,
at 1962-63 (observing how redundancy and overbreadth in criminal codes, coupled with
broad prosecutorial discretion, permits prosecutors to manipulate post-trial sentences);
Standen, supra note 41, at 1506-12 (setting forth the connection between the federal
sentencing guidelines and increased prosecutorial power to shape plea outcomes through
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My philosophy was ... to
pleading stage to set the stage for a plea ....
charge aggressively to allow for a plea to a lesser offense. 7 8 The
inflated charging instrument produces a higher possible maximum
sentence and a higher initial anchor. 9 Once the parties commence
negotiations, the prosecutor will make a higher pretrial offer than she
would without passion, again influencing the anchors used by the
parties. Finally, high demands made by passionate prosecutors can also
influence judges, who tend to anchor on the prosecutors' positions at
sentencing.Y
5. Sunk Costs
Finally, prosecutorial passion can decrease prosecutors' willingness
to negotiate because of sunk cost effects. Although a rational decision
maker should evaluate the utility of his options prospectively," ample
evidence demonstrates that people are affected by sunk costs and permit
prior investments of time, money, and resources to influence their
current choices.' The sunk cost fallacy can affect a prosecutor's plea
negotiations in differing ways, depending on where the prosecutor is
sinking her costs. In a typical case that the prosecutor assumes will
eventually be plea bargained, the prosecutor is unlikely to do much
work in preparation for a trial. To the extent she expends any effort on
the case, those efforts are more likely to be dedicated to the bargaining
process itself, increasing her commitment to reaching an ultimate

charging decisions); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2558 (2004) ("[G]iven the array of weapons the law
provides, prosecutors are often in a position to dictate outcomes.").
78. As Justice Blackmun observed long ago, "prosecutors, without saying so, may
sometimes bring charges more serious than they think appropriate for the ultimate
disposition of a case, in order to gain bargaining leverage with a defendant." Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. See also Bibas, supra note 6, at 2519 (explaining that overcharging provides high
anchors).
80. Id. at 2518-19 (summarizing empirical research).
81. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology and Economics Conference Handbook:
Comments on Simon, on Einhornand Hogarth,and on Tversky and Kahneman, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 95, 98 (Robin M.

Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987) ("Historical or sunk costs should be irrelevant.").
82. See generally Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985); Hal R. Arkes &
Laura Hutzel, The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost Effect, 13 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 295 (2000); Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual
and Group DecisionMaking: A Prospect Theory Approach, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430 (1993).
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agreement. 83
In contrast, when a prosecutor is passionate about a case, she has
selected it as special among the competing files in her caseload. She has
chosen the case as one she is willing to take to trial to maximize the
possible sentence against the defendant. Accordingly, she will estimate
the likelihood of a trial in that case as being higher than in the cases in
which she is flexible about negotiations. Because the chances of a trial
are higher, she will complete more and earlier trial preparation. ' Once
she has expended substantial time and energy preparing for the trial,
those efforts become sunk costs that will reduce her willingness to
negotiate a plea bargain.85
One might argue that factoring in the sunk costs of trial preparation
in negotiating a plea is in fact rational. A central premise of plea
bargaining is that defendants are rewarded for helping to conserve the
government's resources. Accordingly, defendants who consume more
resources by pleading guilty late in the process should receive less of a
discount than defendants who plead early. Moreover, to create an
incentive for defendants to plead guilty early and to dissuade them from
refusing early offers in hopes of a better deal later, prosecutors should
be less flexible in negotiations as the trial date approaches."6 Both of
these arguments, however, focus on the amount of time that the
defendant allows to pass before entering a plea. They do not justify
treating defendants differently on the basis of a prosecutor's unilateral
decision to expend more preparatory work in some cases than in others,
well in advance of trial.

83. See Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation, 20

OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 740 (2005) (warning that parties might view protracted
settlement efforts as sunk costs that prevent them from walking away from a potential deal).
84. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness
of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 107 (1993) (noting that prosecutors

give more attention to the preparation of high priority cases than to cases that are plea
bargained).
85. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil

Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 24 (1999) (observing in the civil context that "[a]
client who has spent a great deal of money on pretrial motions and discovery may be very
reluctant to settle a case for less than costs or to walk away from the case"); Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73

TEX. L. REV. 753, 758-59 (1995) (arguing in the civil context that mandatory disclosure
requirements reduce the likelihood of settlement because the required disclosure is a sunk
cost that parties do not ignore).
86. I am grateful to Professor Bruce Green for this point.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING REFORM

This is the natural moment in the Article to set forth normative
proposals. I cannot move on to prescriptive suggestions, however,
without first noting that the question of how-or even whether-to
respond to prosecutorial passion implicates two broader debates that I
do not seek to resolve here. First, because my observations about
prosecutorial passion have assumed that individual prosecutors have
unfettered discretion, they raise the question of how much discretion
individual prosecutors should enjoy. One way of mitigating the role of
prosecutorial passion and to increase uniformity in plea bargaining
outcomes would be to reduce prosecutorial discretion. Office-wide
prosecutorial policies could require, for example, that prosecutors file
all charges for which probable cause exists and then comply with rigid
plea bargaining guidelines.87
Arguably, however, prosecutorial discretion, and even the passions it
permits, advance legitimate justifications for criminal punishment.
Because of either retributive or utilitarian reasons, perhaps prosecutors
should, for example, distinguish between a shooting that occurs between
strangers and one between rival drug dealers.'
Conceivably,
prosecutors use their discretion fairly and wisely to identify the cases
that warrant the most attention, relying on factual distinctions that
would elude any workable set of guidelines established ex ante. 9 I do
not attempt to resolve here the desirability of prosecutorial discretion.
Just as many who have studied plea bargaining's imperfections have
concluded that plea bargaining is inevitable, 90 this Article assumes
likewise about prosecutorial discretion.
Similarly, although I have attempted to explain the ways that
prosecutorial passion might deprive defendants of the presumed

87. O'Hear, supra note 45, at 756 (suggesting that binding charging and plea bargaining
guidelines for prosecutors would increase uniformity in sentencing); Fred C. Zacharias,
Justice in Plea Bargaining,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 (1998).
88. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2470 (recognizing that prosecutors may legitimately "drive
hard bargains on particular crimes to send messages, teach lessons, and deter especially
harmful or prevalent crimes").
89. Cf Breyer, supra note 26, at 8-12 (noting the tension between the substantive justice
found in real offense sentencing and the procedural justice that comes with charge offense
sentencing).
90. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 2547; Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining,75
TUL. L. REV. 695, 699 (2001) ("[a]ccepting the premise that plea bargaining is an essential
component of our criminal justice system"); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 5, at 2299; Fred C.
Zacharias, supra note 87, at 1123 ("This Article accepts plea bargaining as a given.").
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advantages of plea bargaining,9 ' I do not attempt to answer here the
question of whether all defendants should be entitled to obtain a
sentencing discount in exchange for their guilty pleas. Whether
defendants should be granted an opportunity to plea bargain implicates
the broader question of whether negotiated plea outcomes are
discounted or whether post-trial sentences are inflated.
If plea
bargained outcomes are viewed as lenient, then denying them to the
most serious offenders is justified.
If, however, plea bargained
outcomes are just, and post-trial sentences impose additional
punishment simply to penalize the defendant's choice to go to trial, then
all defendants should have the opportunity to exchange their trial rights
for a negotiated plea outcome.
Even without tackling the desirability of prosecutorial discretion or a
defendant's entitlement to claim a plea bargaining discount,
understanding the ways that prosecutorial passion can color plea
bargaining nevertheless has implications for both plea bargaining
practice and reform. This Part considers those implications from the
perspective of prosecutors, courts, and defense attorneys.
A. Prosecutors
As an initial matter, prosecutors' offices should consider the
implications of prosecutorial passion when determining how to assign
cases within the office. Because the seriousness of a case, and therefore
the passion that it triggers, will be assessed relative to other files
assigned to the same attorney,' defining the jurisdiction of various trial
units amounts to an important policy decision. For example, relatively
new misdemeanor prosecutors will be more passionate about low-level
sex offenses or other person crimes than an experienced prosecutor in a
major crimes unit. Accordingly, the supervisors who determine case
assignments should take into account not only the level of the offense
and the experience of the attorneys in the various trial units, but also the
likely priority that various types of cases will receive in different units.93
Both supervisors and individual prosecutors should also reflect on
the considerations that should properly drive prosecutorial passion. I
91. See supra Part H.A.
92. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
93. When I was a prosecutor, for example, the office determined that misdemeanor
cases with children as victims should be assigned to the misdemeanor lawyers in the domestic
violence unit. These attorneys were more seasoned than prosecutors in the general
misdemeanor unit but would give the cases more attention than they could receive in the
major crimes unit that handled felonies with person victims.
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have suggested that the passion that comes with prosecutorial discretion
may be defensible because individual prosecutors arguably draw
legitimate distinctions among their cases. However, prosecutorial
passion should not be based on illegitimate factors such as
discrimination, personal animosity, self-interest, or media attention. 94
Accordingly, even if a prosecutors' office does not set forth detailed
policies to mandate specified plea outcomes in individual cases, it might
nevertheless set forth the principles that should guide prosecutorial

discretion in plea bargaining.
example, have advocated

Professors Green and Zacharias, for

that prosecutorial supervisors articulate
95

"factors that society wishes prosecutors to implement or ignore."

Finally, even if prosecutorial passion is justifiable when based on
legitimate considerations, prosecutors should prefer a decision-making
process that approximates rationality and avoids the distortions of
cognitive biases that can be induced and exaggerated by prosecutorial

passion. 96

One potential method of reducing cognitive bias in

prosecutors would be to educate them about the influences of biases like

selective information processing, anchoring, framing, loss aversion,
over-optimism, hindsight bias, and sunk cost effects on plea bargaining,

and the ways that prosecutorial passion can either induce or exaggerate
these effects. Although research on debiasing suggests that awareness
of cognitive biases is no panacea for perfect rationality, 97 some evidence

suggests that educating people about the cognitive processes that cause
bias can improve the quality of decision making. 98
Prosecutors could also be educated about debiasing strategies that

94. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004
WIs. L. REV. 837, 849-52 (identifying the lack of bias, partisanship, and arbitrariness as three
dimensions of prosecutorial neutrality).
95. Id. at 896; see also Erik Luna, PrincipledEnforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BuFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 515, 524 (2000) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion should be governed by
articulated principles); Zacharias, supra note 87, at 1184 (advocating that prosecutors' offices
specify the model of plea bargaining that individual prosecutors should use).
96. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to
Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) (calling on prosecutors to implement
strategies to mitigate the cognitive biases that can contribute to wrongful convictions).
97. See, e.g., P.C. WASON & P.N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING:

STRUCTURE & CONTENT 194-97 (1972); Lee Ross et al., Perseverancein Self-Perception and
Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J.OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 888 (1975).
98. NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 47, at 191 ("The effectiveness of a variety of
procedures for discrediting information also may depend on their capacity to make subjects
aware of some of the processes underlying the perseverance of their beliefs."); Ross et. al,
supra note 97, at 887-88.
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have been proven to improve rationality. For example, empirical
evidence demonstrates that the biasing effects of people's pre-existing
beliefs are mitigated when people are forced to articulate the opposing
perspective.'
Accordingly, prosecutors could reduce the biasing
influences of prosecutorial passion by considering both the evidence of
the defendant's guilt and the relevant sentencing considerations from

the perspective of the defense.'
B. Courts
The distorting influences of prosecutorial passion upon plea
bargaining also provide further support for increased judicial
involvement in plea negotiations. 1 Although the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice,"° the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,'
and
several states l '4 currently limit, prohibit, or discourage the participation
of judges in plea bargaining, empirical evidence suggests that, when
permitted, judicial involvement in negotiations can improve both
0
efficiency and fairness in plea bargaining."
One contribution of judicial
99. Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231-32 (1984).
100. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2523-24; Burke, supra note 96, at 524 (proposing "switching
sides" as a means to reduce the effects of cognitive biases on prosecutorial decision making);
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 52, at 1094 (suggesting in the civil context that litigating parties
could reduce bias by examining disputes "through the eyes of their opponents").
101. Several scholars have called for a more active role of the judiciary in plea
bargaining. E.g., Bibas, supra note 6, at 2542 (exploring the possibility of giving judges a
more active role in plea bargaining); Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the JudicialRole in Criminal
Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2049-52 (2006) (proposing increased
judicial scrutiny of negotiated pleas as a means of reigning in prosecutorial discretion in plea
bargaining); Miximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
ProsecutorialAdjudication in American Criminal Procedure,33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 284-85
(2006) (calling for a stronger role for judges in plea colloquies); cf Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is
Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1106-07 (1984) (proposing short trials as
an alternative to plea bargaining).
102. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.3(d)

(1999).
103. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(c)(1) (prohibiting judicial participation in plea negotiations).
104. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-7-302(1) (West
2006). See generally Alschuler, supra note 32, at 1059 ("The general consensus seems to be
that trial judges should not participate in the pretrial negotiations ....
); Jenia Iontcheva
Turner, Judicial Participationin Plea Negotiations:A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
199, 202 n.6 (2006) (listing nine states and the District of Colombia as prohibiting judicial
participation in plea negotiations and five others that discourage the practice).
105. Seung-Hee Lee, The Scales of Justice: Balancing Neutrality and Efficiency in PleaBargaining Encounters, 16 DISCOURSE & SOC'Y 33, 34 (2005) (summarizing results of
empirical studies); see also Alschuler, supra note 32, at 1129-33; HEUMANN, supra note 22, at
150-52; Turner, supra note 104, at 200 (favorably reviewing the significant judicial
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involvement in plea bargaining might be judges' ability to mitigate the
irrational distortions of a prosecutor's passions on plea outcomes.
Presumably, judges, if not unaffected by cognitive biases, are at least less
affected by them than prosecutors, because they have no (or at least
fewer) pre-existing beliefs about the case to induce selective information
processing and have little (or at least, less) at stake in the case to induce
framing and sunk cost effects. Accordingly, judges stand in a better
position to make a more objective, accurate assessment of the likelihood
of conviction."°
One of the prevailing concerns about judicial
involvement in plea bargaining is that the judge might be or appear to
be biased should negotiations fail and the case proceed to trial.
However, concerns about a trial judge's neutrality can be resolved by
reassigning the case to another judge should negotiations prove
fruitless.0 7
Judges can help the parties assess not only the likelihood of
conviction at trial, but also the likely sentence after a conviction is
obtained at trial. Indeed, in indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions,
judicial involvement may be the best method of yielding an accurate
assessment of the likely post-trial sentence.' 8 A pretrial assessment of a
defendant's likely post-trial sentence could enhance the chances of a
resolution between the parties by providing an objective counterpoint to
a prosecutor's passion-induced and perhaps unrealistic sentencing
hopes. A judge's sentencing evaluation could also at least partially
restore a defendant's ability to exchange his guilty plea for a sentencing
discount when a passionate prosecutor refuses to plea bargain.1"
Although only the prosecutor has the authority to dismiss charges in
exchange for the defendant's plea, a judge with sentencing discretion
could conduct an informal pretrial sentencing inquiry to determine the
likely post-trial sentence, and then offer the defendant whatever
discount is warranted."0
Another preliminary suggestion for mitigating the distorting effects

participation in plea bargaining in Germany, Florida, and Connecticut).
106. See Alschuler, supra note 32, at 1131.
107. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2543; Turner, supra note 104, at 201 (noting that Connecticut
permits judges to be involved actively in plea negotiations but prohibits them from also acting
as trial judge).
108. See Turner, supra note 104, at 209.
109. See supra Part II.A.
110. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text for the debate between scholars
about whether sentencing discounts should be fixed or should reflect the defendant's
likelihood of an acquittal at trial.
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of prosecutorial passion on plea bargaining would be to improve parties'
access to objective sentencing information. Despite the focus in much of
the plea bargaining literature on the power that prosecutors enjoy under
determinate sentencing schemes,"' indeterminate sentencing is still the
norm in state courts."12 Because indeterminate sentencing is uncertain,
the parties may not agree on the likely post-trial sentence, preventing
them from reaching a plea agreement."' The cognitive biases explored
in Part II.B suggest that prosecutors are especially likely to overestimate
likely sentences in cases about which they are passionate. One way of
increasing the accuracy of the parties' sentencing assessments is to
increase their access to sentencing outcomes in their own jurisdictions."'
For example, sentencing information systems in Australia and Scotland
provide judges with computerized historical sentencing data by offense

and offender categories."'

In the United States, Multnomah County,

Oregon has implemented a "Decision Support System" that contains
detailed sentencing information among other data."6 Increased access
111. See supra note 45.
112. See MICHAEL TONRY,

AND
THE FRAGMENTATION OF SENTENCING
CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 2 (1999); Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing

Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 382 n.18 (2005); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:
Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1191 (2005)
(noting that at least eighteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted sentencing
guidelines). Moreover, even under the federal sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), injects increased judicial discretion
and therefore increased uncertainty into sentencing.
113. Bibas, supra note 6, at 2495 n.129 ("In indeterminate-sentencing states, sentencing
remains uncertain and thus will cast fuzzy shadows as well.").
114. Id. at 2532 (recommending creation of a database of post-trial and post-plea
sentences).
115. See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing
Information Systems, Transparency,and the Next Generationof Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1351, 1372-75 (2005).
116. Multnomah County's Decision Support System is a vast data warehouse that
includes not only offense and sentence information but also recidivism and other data. The
System's underlying sentencing purpose is to provide judges with an empirical basis for
determining the sentence most likely to prevent the defendant from reoffending in the future,
a more ambitious goal than simply helping judges and parties to know what has been done in
the past. See Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation:CriminalJustice's
Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 679 (2004) ("The point of all of this is not to ask
technology to select a sentence, but to focus the attention of the sentencing process on the
issue of public safety."); Michael Marcus, Smarter Sentencing: On the Need to Consider Crime
Reduction as a Goal, 40 CT. REV., Winter 2004, at 16, 21 (noting public safety purpose of
system); Michael Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety: What's Wrong
and How We Can Fix It, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 76, 79 (2003) ("[W]e have constructed a data
warehouse and have developed the tools with which to give all involved in sentencing
decisions rapid access to information about what works on which offenders.") (citation
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to objective sentencing information could reduce the chance of
prosecutorial inflation of estimated post-trial sentences.
C. Defense Attorneys
Although defense attorneys have little control over decisions by the
prosecutors with whom they negotiate, understanding the influence of
passion on prosecutors might assist defense attorneys strategically.
Defense attorneys who believe they face a passionate prosecutor should
attempt to determine the factors triggering the prosecutor's passion.
Persuading a prosecutor to revisit her assessment of a case is inherently
difficult," 7 but a defense attorney would be in a better position to do so
if he at least understood that a prosecutor might be driven by unobvious
factors. Moreover, simply as a strategic matter, defense attorneys
negotiating with a passionate prosecutor might search for opportunities
to plea bargain with a different prosecutor in the office or to appeal to
the judge or the prosecutor's supervisor.
IV. CONCLUSION

A traditional assumption of plea bargaining is that its results mirror
both probable trial and sentencing outcomes. Scholars are increasingly
challenging that assumption by demonstrating how structural
imperfections and cognitive biases can influence plea bargaining in ways
that are wholly unrelated to any legitimate penological purpose. This
Article has attempted to add to the growing literature on plea
bargaining by exploring the ways that individual, in contrast to
institutional, prosecutorial discretion-particularly when guided by
passion-can magnify non-penological influences on plea bargaining
and by discussing the implications of prosecutorial passion on current
reform proposals.
Throughout the Article, I have used the narratives of several
prosecutors to illustrate the arguments I have advanced. I made that
decision not only because I found their perspectives-offered in their
own voices-to be consequential, but also because those narrators are
part of the audience I am trying to reach. The largest challenge for the
dynamic and growing body of scholarship on plea bargaining is to reach
its target audience. By its very nature, plea bargaining is the quick,
omitted).
117. See supra Part II.B.1, for a discussion of selective information processing; see also
Burke, supra note 51, at 1603-13; Findley & Scott, supra note 51, at 312-13; Raeder, supra
note 51, at 1327.
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dirty, and unreflective aspect of criminal law practice. Parties strike
deals without deliberating their reasons for doing so, let alone
considering the flaws that might exist in their cognitive processes. I
have tried to explore the prosecutor's perspective from the prosecutor's
perspective in the hope that the parties who have the greatest ability to
create and implement reforms will choose to do so.

*

*

*

